Abstract: Everettian accounts of quantum mechanics entail that people branch; every possible result of a measurement actually occurs, and I have one successor for each result. Is there room for probability in such an account? The prima facie answer is no; there are no ontic chances here, and no ignorance about what will happen. But since any adequate quantum mechanical theory must make probabilistic predictions, much recent philosophical labor has gone into trying to construct an account of probability for branching selves. One popular strategy involves arguing that branching selves introduce a new kind of subjective uncertainty. I argue here that the variants of this strategy in the literature all fail, either because the uncertainty is spurious, or because it is in the wrong place to yield probabilistic predictions. I conclude that uncertainty cannot be the ground for probability in Everettian quantum mechanics.
Introduction: The problem
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics arises because the mathematical heart of the theory, Schrödinger's wave mechanics, apparently entails that every possible result of a measurement actually occurs, yet we experience only one of the possible results. Various additions and modifications to Schrödinger's wave mechanics have been proposed to deal with 4 A related problem concerns confirmation; if Everett's theory entails every possible sequence of measurement results, then no such sequence can confirm it. I have nothing directly to say about this problem here. 5 There is an alternative strategy, namely to argue that a probability measure is meaningful even in the absence of subjective uncertainty (Papineau 2004; Greaves 2004) . I discuss this strategy briefly in sections 4 and 6 below. them in the following sections. My contention is that they either fail to locate a genuine source of uncertainty, or locate the uncertainty in the wrong place to ground the required probability measure.
To make my case, I will need to refer to three prominent accounts of personal identity in branching situations. According to the first account, a person is a three-dimensional object that persists over time. There is one person prior to the branching event, and there are two persons after the branching event. The pre-branching person is not identical to either post-branching person (since they are not identical to each other), but is psychologically continuous with each of them. Call this the Parfitian account (Parfit 1984) . According to the second account, a person is a four-dimensional entity-a space-time worm. There are two persons present both before and after branching; they coincide before the branching event, but diverge thereafter. Hence each pre-branching person is identical to exactly one post-branching person. Call this the Lewisian account (Lewis 1983) . According to the third account, a person is a temporal stage of a fourdimensional entity-a time-slice of a space-time worm. There is one person present prior to branching and two persons present afterwards. Strict identity does not hold between these persons, since they are distinct temporal stages, but nevertheless the pre-measurement person has two post-measurement temporal counterparts, and the existence of such counterparts makes it the case that the pre-measurement person will be each of the post-measurement persons. Call this the Siderian account (Sider 1996) .
Saunders' argument
Consider an observer watching a spin measurement, with possible outcomes 'up' and 'down'.
Let t 1 be a time just before the measurement, and let she 1 be the observer at t 1 . Let t 2 be a time just after the measurement, and let she 2 ↑ and she 2 ↓ be the observer's two successors at t 2 , seeing she 1 is informed concerning her situation, she knows that she will see 'up' and she knows that she will see 'down', and there is nothing for her to be uncertain about. However, this conclusion is challenged by Wallace (2005, 11 It is worth noting that Greaves' argument would go through under a Parfitian account of personal identity. Under such an account, she 1 is not identical to either she 2 ↑ or she 2 ↓ , but she 1 survives through each of them, and again there is nothing about which she 1 is uncertain.
branching situations which preserves transitivity of identity, namely the Lewisian account. Since Greaves does not discuss this possibility, her argument against Saunders remains inconclusive.
So before drawing any firm conclusions, we must first examine Wallace's explicitly Lewisian reconstruction of Saunders' argument. Wallace (2005, 13) claims that the Lewisian account of personal identity can be used to defend Saunders' account of uncertainty in Everettian branching. According to the Lewisian account, there are two persons present at t 1 , one of whom will become she 2 ↑ and one of whom will become she 2 ↓ , but since the two persons are physically identical up to the measurement, neither of them can discover which one she will become, except by waiting to find out. Hence Saunders' option (iii) is, after all, the right way to describe each of the two pre-measurement persons, and there can be genuine uncertainty about the future in an Everettian universe.
Wallace's Lewisian argument
I agree that the Lewisian account of personal identity is tenable, and I agree that it yields a kind of indeterminacy about who an Everettian observer will become, but I don't think this indeterminacy underwrites any kind of uncertainty. Consider again the road analogy. It is certainly possible to identify a road with its whole course, rather than with a road-segment. On this view, there are two roads even at x 1 , one of which ultimately goes to Upton and the other of which ultimately goes to Downham. These two roads have all physical properties in common up to the fork, but thereafter they have different physical properties. Indeed, this way of individuating roads is sometimes reflected in road numbering systems; for example, it could be that the 15 goes to Upton and the 501 goes to Downham, but they coincide for a few miles might reasonably ask where High Street leads to, and be told that it leads to a fork in the road, beyond which the right fork leads to Upton and the left fork leads to Downham. This answer would, if I accept it, eliminate my uncertainty. Notice that this system does not identify either the road to Upton or the Road to Downham with High Street; rather, High Street bears a certain relation to them. That is, the system of local names gives up on strict identity between roadsegments, and makes do with leading to relations between them instead. The local name system for individuating roads in a sense contradicts the road number system of the prior paragraph;
according to the number system there are two roads at x 1 , and according to the local name system there is just one. But the contradiction is superficial; it is not that there is some true number of roads at x 1 that we must capture, but rather that the number of roads at x 1 depends on how we choose to count them.
I maintain that parallel considerations apply to Everettian persons. We can, if we wish, adopt the Lewis criterion for personal identity in Everettian contexts, in which case there are (in that sense) two persons prior to measurement. We could even give these two persons names, say she ↑ and she ↓ , so that she ↑ refers to the person who sees 'up' and she ↓ refers to the person who sees 'down'. If I walk into the lab and ask "What result is she about to see?", I might be told "she ↑ will see 'up' and she ↓ will see 'down', and at the moment she ↑ and she ↓ coincide". That ought to eliminate my uncertainty, provided that I understand and accept Everett's theory. In particular, I can't wonder further whether my use of the pronoun 'she' when pointing at the observer picks out she ↑ or she ↓ ; since she ↑ and she ↓ coincide at the moment, I am pointing at both of them.
One might object here that I can wonder whether my use of the pronoun 'she' when pointing at the observer picks out she ↑ or she . There is no further fact concerning which of she ↑ and she ↓ makes the utterance, and which of them it is directed at; it is made by them both, and directed at them both, and hence there is no room for uncertainty.
9
To make the same point in a slightly different (although perhaps more controversial) way, I am not convinced that the pronoun 'I' picks out a person in any deep metaphysical sense, any more than the pronoun 'she' does, or any more than the demonstrative phrase 'this road' picks out a particular numbered road. Recall that in the case of roads, the number system was one way of individuating roads, but not the only way. We can also individuate roads by local name, in which case there is only one road at x 1 . One system may be more convenient than the other for various purposes, but neither has a better claim to embody the way roads really are. So it is, I contend, with persons. We can individuate persons in the Lewis way, in which case there are two persons at t 1 , or we can individuate persons in the Parfitian or Siderian way, in which case there is one person at t 1 . For a reductivist about persons, I see no reason to regard one of these as embodying the unique correct account of persons. But recall from the previous section that 9 See Tappenden (2006) for the details of this argument. Lewis apparently concurs; in the case of two persons C 1 and C 2 , who currently coincide but later diverge, he writes that "the 'me' in their shared thought … cannot refer to C 1 in C 1 's thought and C 2 in C 2 's thought, for these thoughts are one and the same" (1983, 75 
Wallace's semantic argument
Despite his defense of Saunders' account of uncertainty, Wallace doesn't regard this as an adequate solution to the problem of uncertainty. The reason is that he thinks the question of how we would extend our identity concepts were we to discover cases of branching is somewhat beside the point. Rather, the question is how we should understand our current concepts, given
Hence it is not so clear whether the Elite View or the Charitable View is to be generally preferred in situations like this. Historical precedents go either way. On the one hand, the fact that tables and such are mostly empty space did not lead us to interpret our prior claims that tables are solid as false or truth-valueless. Rather, we came to regard as mistaken certain connections between solidity and other concepts, such as impenetrability; a material particle could, after all, traverse a solid object. On the other hand, the null result of the MichelsonMorley experiment did lead us to interpret our prior claims that light is a vibration in the ether as false or truth-valueless. We chose instead to retain the conceptual connections according to which the ether was regarded as a material medium. Furthermore, neither of these precedents is particularly clear-cut; Eddington (1928, xiv) famously argues that our belief in the solidity of tables is really false, and Kitcher (1993, 147) suggests that historical claims that light is a vibration in the ether could be interpreted as true. My suspicion is that there is no pressing need to decide these matters; the Elite View and the Charitable View constitute pragmatic choices about how to use language, and we can make different choices in different contexts, provided we make our choice clear.
But I do not need to defend this view here, since the main point I wish to stress is that whether we adopt the Charitable View or the Elite View regarding uncertainty, the use of uncertainty to ground the concept of probability in Everett worlds is blocked. This is obviously the case for the Elite View, as Wallace notes; if our claims to uncertainty as to the results of measurements are not true, then that uncertainty cannot provide the basis for a probability measure over those results. But if we adopt the Charitable View, the conceptual connection between uncertainty and ignorance of fact is lost, and it is arguably via this conceptual connection that uncertainty is related to (subjective) probability. A subjective probability measure is, after all, a measure of degree of belief, so unless uncertainty entails ignorance about the measurement result, no probability other than 1 can be assigned to any result. This may yield a probability measure in a trivial sense, but it is certainly not the Born rule.
To clarify, consider the road analogy again. Suppose we discover that people branch in much the same way that roads branch. How are we likely to interpret our prior uncertainty claims concerning what will happen to us? When we're in full possession of the facts, we don't say that we're uncertain where the road goes, so we might be inclined to dismiss our prior uncertainty claims as false. But as noted in the previous section, we might notice that there is a sense in which we can regard the destination of a forking road as indeterminate, since the road has no unique destination. In that case, we might try to recover the truth of our uncertainty claims by assimilating them with indeterminacy claims; when I said "I am uncertain what will happen to me", what I said was true, and what I meant was something close to "It is indeterminate what will happen to me". But whichever option we take (and I suspect we might take both, on different occasions), there is no role for probability here. First, there is a perfectly good interpretation of our prior uncertainty claims under which they are false, so there is a perfectly straightforward sense in which probability is inapplicable. Second, even if we choose to interpret uncertainty claims as true, we do so by assimilating uncertainty to indeterminacy, and this severs the connection between uncertainty and ignorance of fact that could justify the application of a probability measure.
The conceptual connection between uncertainty and ignorance could be recovered by adopting a Charitable View of the meaning of ignorance claims too; "I am ignorant concerning whether A will happen" has also always meant that A will happen in some but not all future branches. But this just pushes the problem further back; now the severed connection is between ignorance and any question concerning the actuality of A. As a last-ditch strategy, one might insist that an observer can attach a probability (other than 0 or 1) to A even in the absence of any question concerning the actuality of A. But now I wonder why we were looking for uncertainty in the first place, since what is doing the work here is a reconceptualization of probability. This latter strategy is that of Papineau (2004) and Greaves (2004); Greaves, for example, suggests that one think of a probability measure in an Everett world as a measure of how much an observer cares about her successors. I have nothing to say about this strategy here, except that it makes the search for uncertainty in Everettian quantum mechanics entirely beside the point.
Hence I don't think that Wallace's argument from interpretive charity succeeds. While it may be the case that we would (or could) interpret our current uncertainty claims as true even if it turns out that we live in an Everett world, the concept of uncertainty could not emerge unscathed from this transformation in our understanding. The reason that so many authors are trying to find a source of uncertainty in Everett's theory is that there is a prima facie connection between uncertainty and probability. But once we engage in the radical reinterpretation of our uncertainty claims that Wallace suggests, this prima facie connection is lost, and it is no longer clear how uncertainty is a route to probability.
Uncertainty after the fact
There is, however, a place for uncertainty about measurement results in Everett's theory that is quite uncontroversial-that doesn't rely on any special views about the metaphysics of persons or the semantics of 'uncertain'. This place-or rather, this time-is after the measurement is complete. Suppose an observer closes her eyes during a spin measurement. She ends up with two successors, each of whom can ask herself "I wonder whether I will see 'up' or 'down' when I open my eyes?". Here, then, is genuine, unproblematic uncertainty in an Everett world, uncertainty that does involve ignorance about a matter of fact. However, this uncertainty may never be actualized in a particular case, for example if the observer keeps her eyes open and the measurement proceeds quickly enough (Wallace 2005, 21) ; this is something that we will have to bear in mind as we proceed.
The argument that this after-the-fact uncertainty provides the foundation for probability in Everett worlds is made by Vaidman (1998; 2002) . Clearly Vaidman succeeds at finding something in Everett's theory that we can coherently quantify using a subjective probability measure. What is not so clear is whether this is the probability we were looking for. Recall that the reason it is important to find a place for probability in Everett's theory is that the use of quantum mechanics to make decisions seem to require a sense in which Everett's theory can make probabilistic predictions. But notice that Vaidman's after-the-fact probabilities are not predictive in any obvious sense; the observer may be uncertain about what has happened, but not about what will happen. That is, the uncertainty seems to be in the wrong place to play any role in decision.
Vaidman (2002) is aware of this difficulty, and suggests the following solution. First, he suggests that we define the observer's pre-measurement probability for a given outcome to be the post-measurement ignorance probability of her successors. This gives us the right numbers for the pre-measurement probabilities (assuming the quantitative problem can be solved), but it isn't clear what these numbers represent, since there is no pre-measurement uncertainty. As Vaidman (2002) admits, "since all outcomes of a quantum experiment are actualized, there is no probability in the usual sense" prior to the experiment. Nevertheless, he argues that the observer "should behave as if there were certain probabilities for different outcomes". That is, even though the numbers assigned to the various outcomes prior to measurement aren't genuine subjective probabilities, they are effective probabilities, in the sense that the observer should behave as if she already had the degrees of belief that she can expect her post-measurement successors to have. Hence post-measurement uncertainty can play the required role in premeasurement decision.
Greaves (2004, 442) also endorses this line of argument, noting that it rests on a particular kind of reflection principle. 10 It is not an epistemic reflection principle; the postmeasurement uncertainty does not give the pre-measurement observer reason to be uncertain.
Rather, it is a decision-theoretic reflection principle; the pre-measurement observer should adopt the same decision strategy as her post-measurement successors. As noted above, there may be no time at which a particular observer is uncertain about a given measurement result, since she may be aware of the measurement result as soon as the measurement is performed, but I don't think this is an insurmountable problem. The reflection principle can simply be modified to say that the pre-measurement observer should adopt the decision strategy that the post-measurement observer would have had, had she not learned the result.
But I think the road analogy shows that any such decision-theoretic reflection principle is inappropriate here. Suppose I am traveling down the road as a passenger in a car, and I close my eyes, so that I don't know which way the car goes at the fork. After the fork, I am genuinely uncertain whether this road is the road to Upton or the road to Downham. This uncertainty may ground a subjective probability measure; I may judge that it is twice as likely that this is the road to Upton as that this is the road to Downham (for whatever reason). This subjective probability assignment may in turn lead to certain behaviors or strategies; I may be prepared to bet at 2:1 10 Greaves attributes the reflection principle to Wallace (2002b, 58) . She endorses the reflection argument in the sense that she thinks it constitutes a successful solution to the incoherence problem. However, it is not her preferred solution, since she feels that it "obscures the real logic of the argument" (2004, 443) . Her preferred solution is to adopt the caring account of probability mentioned at the end of the previous section.
odds that this is the road to Downham. But now consider my behavior before the fork. Should I behave as if I judge that the chance that this is the road to Downham is 1/3 at that point as well?
Surely not; I know that this is the road to Downham, just as I know that it is the road to Upton. If I am offered a bet that returns $1 for a $10 stake if this is the road to Downham, then before the fork I should take it, and after the fork I should not.
Note, again, that the analogy is between the road and the Everettian person. In the road case, it may well be rationally incumbent on me to adopt the same probability that I am going to I agree that there are post-measurement facts of which an observer may be genuinely uncertain, but I don't think Ismael's characterization of these facts-as facts about which branch contains which result-is appropriate. Recall again that there is nothing in Everett's theory over and above the quantum state. To say that the state has branches is just to say that it can be written as a sum of more-or-less independent terms, where each term is taken as a description of a state of affairs-say, the state of affairs in which the measurement result is 'up'. So the state of affairs is the branch-it is not contained in the branch-and it makes no sense to conceive of the same state of affairs in a different branch. So there are no facts about which measurement result appears in which branch; whatever it is I am uncertain about, this is not it. Ismael is of course free to postulate the existence of 'worlds' as entities over and above the quantum mechanical state, but this would be to give up on the 'nothing but the physics' approach that she clearly endorses (2003, 779) .
Then what is the fact that I am uncertain about, after the measurement? It is the fact that can only be expressed indexically, the fact that measurement result here is 'up'. But the point about such facts, as argued above, is that I can't wonder about them in advance. source of uncertainty in Everettian quantum mechanics, this uncertainty cannot ground the premeasurement probability measure that we are after.
Conclusion
I have examined several arguments that inhabitants of Everett worlds may be uncertain about what will happen to them. None of these arguments, I think, succeed in locating the kind of uncertainty that could ground non-trivial probability assignments to measurement outcomes.
Arguments from personal identity fail to identify any genuine source of uncertainty. Arguments from interpretive charity can perhaps recover the truth of uncertainty claims in Everett worlds, but only at the expense of severing the connection between uncertainty and probability. Vaidman and Ismael locate a genuine source of after-the-fact uncertainty-inhabitants of Everett worlds may be uncertain about what has happened-but neither succeeds in connecting this uncertainty to a predictive probability assignment.
It is possible that there is some other source of uncertainty in Everett worlds that has so far been overlooked, but if the analogy between branching persons and branching roads developed above is appropriate, this seems unlikely. There is, however, an alternative strategy for grounding probability in Everett worlds that does not require any subjective uncertainty. That is, one postulates a relation between an observer and her successors, which might be described as how much she cares about each of them, and uses this relation to ground a probability assignment (Papineau 2004; Greaves 2004) . Examining the tenability of this approach, however, will have to wait for another day.
